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The Church Steps Back  
Ronald R. Stockton 
            
“It looks as if we threw the Palestinians under the bus.” 
  Presbyterian commissioner 
 
 “We are deeply moved…” 
  Jewish leader 
 
 “Divestment is still an option but not the goal” 
  Presbyterian Pastoral Letter 
 
 
In 2004 the Presbyterian General Assembly (GA) voted to initiate a process of 
“phased selective divestment in multinational corporations operating in Israel” and “to 
make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly Council for action.”1  The 
denomination’s Mission Responsibility Through Investment Committee (MRTI), which 
had handled several divestments over the past  decades,  was to be in charge of this 
process.  The General Assembly also passed two other resolutions, one that condemned 
the Israeli security barrier for penetrating Palestinian territory and one that criticized 
Christian Zionism for incorrectly interpreting Biblical texts so as to put today’s Israel too 
near the heart of Christian theology.  The resolution on divestment called for “a just and 
equitable solution” to the conflict, rooted in “international law, human rights, the sanctity 
of life, and dignity of persons, land property, safety of home, freedom of movement, the 
rights of refugees to return to their homeland, the right of people to determine their 
political future, and to live in peace and prosperity.” It called for the end of the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian land since it “has proven to be at the root of evil acts committed 
against innocent people on both sides of the conflict.”  It called upon the US to be “an 
honest, even-handed broker for peace,” endorsed the four-party diplomatic “Quartet,” and 
referred to the Geneva Accord negotiating plan as “a useful and practical approach” to a 
settlement.  It called for direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.  It declared 
                                                 
1 This article builds upon an earlier analysis of the actions of the 2004 General Assembly and their 
consequences.  Many topics mentioned in passing were discussed more fully in that earlier work. See 
Ronald R. Stockton, “The Presbyterian Divestiture Vote and the Jewish Response,” Middle  East Policy, 
(Winter, 2005), 98-117.   
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that “horrific acts of violence and deadly attacks on innocent people, whether carried out 
by Palestinian ‘suicide bombers’ or by the Israeli military, are abhorrent and inexcusable 
by all measures, and are a dead end alternative to a negotiated settlement of the conflict.”   
These resolutions were not controversial.  The critical divestment resolution 
passed by an 87% margin.  In 2005 MRTI initiated a routine process of “progressive 
engagement” with five companies, four of which were supporting the Israeli occupation 
of the Palestinian territories, one of which had facilitated the movement of monies by 
Palestinian groups linked to terrorism. As of 2006, the committee had not recommended 
selling any stocks.  Nothing could possibly have been done before 2008.  
The Jewish reaction to these events was almost universally negative.  Some of the 
rhetoric was excessive and bordered on what one observer called reflexive paranoia. 
Presbyterian officials described the response in terms that ranged from “hyperbole that 
makes it so hard to have a productive conversation” to “vilification.”  A representative of 
the American Jewish Committee said the resolutions were “morally reprehensible” and  
represented “a real threat to the economic life and security of Israel.”  A spokesman for 
the Chicago Board of Rabbis said it was a “declaration of economic warfare against the 
state of Israel”  and that the church had become “an apologist for demented killers.”  
Alan Dershowitz of Harvard University said the church had committed a “moral sin” and 
“effectively calls for the end of Israel.”   The head of the Anti-Defamation League said 
the divestment resolution was “offensive and distressing” and that the alleged attempt to 
assert “a moral equivalency” between Israel and the apartheid system of South Africa 
was “unconscionable.”  Congressman Howard Berman and 13 other members of 
Congress wrote an open letter calling the resolution “morally bankrupt” and asked the 
Commerce Department to close down “the illegal divestment campaigns and impose the 
appropriate penalties.”  Both party whips signed the letter.2  
Many Presbyterians were stunned by the reaction.  Some were offended, some  
agreed with the criticisms, some supported the resolutions but wanted to retain close ties 
with the Jewish community.  The 2004 resolutions set off two years of intense activity in 
anticipation of the next General Assembly.   
                                                 
2 Quotes are from ibid., 104-106 and 110.   
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What Happened in Birmingham 
In June of 2006 the General Assembly met in Birmingham, Alabama, the first 
time since it passed its divestment resolution in 2004.  There were 26 overtures 
(resolutions from Presbyteries)  presented to the body addressing Middle East issues, 
particularly involving divestment. Ten wanted to rescind what was done in 2004.  Four 
wanted a strategy of positive investment to “promote peace between the Israeli and 
Palestinian people,” as one put it.  One called for a Task Force to draft a new statement 
on the denomination’s Middle East policy, affirming the “common Abrahamic heritage” 
of Muslims, Christians and Jews.  A few supported the 2004 vote.  Key issues of dispute 
were the 2004 phrase authorizing “phased, selective divestment” from companies 
contributing to violence or profiting from the Israeli occupation,  references to the 
illegality of the Israeli fence/wall, and the tone of the resolution, which was alleged to be 
anti-Israeli.   There was also a “commissioner’s resolution” (not from a presbytery) to 
declare suicide bombings  a “crime against humanity.”  
The overtures were referred to the Peacemaking and International Issues 
Committee made up of 62 persons, half clergy, half elders.  The committee was to 
respond to each of the various overtures and decide what to  recommend  to the full 
assembly.  The Presbyterians have an open door policy for those who want to speak to an 
issue.  Many people, Presbyterians and others, availed themselves of the opportunity to 
present their views. The Presbytery that includes Peoria, Illinois and the Caterpillar 
headquarters strongly opposed divestment. A young Presbyterian who had participated in 
an official delegation to Israel and the occupied territories asked, “Who will speak from 
behind the wall?”  One elder said, “Divestment at least has caught the world’s attention, 
and that’s why I am for it.”  James Woolsey, a former CIA Director  associated with the 
neo-conservative movement, told delegates that  the resolution put the church “clearly on 
the side of theocratic, totalitarian, anti-Semitic, genocidal beliefs, and nothing less.”3  
There had been Palestinian Christian speakers in 2004, but not Jewish speakers.  
Now representatives of several Jewish groups were present representing a range of 
                                                 
3Ferguson, Mike.  “Harsh words:  Former CIA chief Woolsey sharply criticized 2004 GA decision.”  
www:standwithus.com.  
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positions. Rabbi Yitzchok Adlerstein of the Simon Wiesenthal Center asked how the 
Presbyterians could single out Israel but have no concerns about human rights violations 
in Rwanda or China.  Professor Normal Finkelstein, whose book Beyond Chutzpah4 was 
sent  to every commissioner,  said the issue was “a referendum on truth and justice.  The 
truth is…Israel has accumulated a horrendous record of human rights.”  Judea Pearl, 
father of  journalist Daniel Pearl, slain in Pakistan, also spoke. Jewish Voice for Peace 
sent two representatives, Tikkun Magazine sent another.   
A cousin of Rachel Corrie, the young International Solidarity Movement 
volunteer  killed by an Israeli bulldozer in Gaza,  spoke, as did Palestinian Noura Erakat, 
who told of the 26-foot wall: “That wall was built using Caterpillar bulldozers… 
equipped with machine gun mounts.”   The American Friends Service Committee sent 
both Jewish and Arab staff members. One of the only Muslims to speak was a 
representative of the US Campaign to End the Occupation.  The other, Salam Al-
Marayati, Director of Muslim Public Affairs Council, was one of three interfaith speakers 
at a pre-assembly event called “Visions of Peace and Justice in Israel and Palestine.”  The 
others were Mark Pelavin, Associate Director of the Religious Action Center of 
Reformed Judaism, and Dr. Munib Younan, Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
in Jordan and the Holy land.  All three were later invited to speak  before the Committee.  
There were a host of interest groups and booths. Among those  present were the Israeli 
Coalition Against House Demolitions,  Anti-Divestment Committee,  Human Rights 
Watch, and the American Jewish Committee.  Twelve major Jewish organizations 
(discussed below) wrote a four-page, single-spaced letter to all  commissioners and 
advisors  outlining their concerns and asking that the denomination “permanently remove 
this obstacle to peace.”  Commissioners received large  amounts of literature and email 
information before arrival.   Those driving in from the airport were greeted by a large 
billboard proclaiming “Divestment is NOT the Path to Peace.”   
                                                 
4 Many quotes are from Toya Richards Hill, “Committee recommends replacing language calling for 
divestment.” Presbyterian News Service, June 17, 2006.  Finkelstein’s book is Beyond Chutzpah: On the 
Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.  
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An 11-person subgroup of the Peacemaking Committee drafted a resolution, 
approved by the committee by a 53-6-3 vote.5  The writing committee decided to pull 
portions of those various overtures together into a common resolution to present to the 
full assembly. They felt they had achieved a “delicate balance” in their wording  and 
asked that amendments be voted down. But not all commissioners were satisfied.  Some 
were concerned that the  resolution made no reference to the condition of the 
Palestinians. Others were offended by a reference to alleged “flaws in our process” in the 
2004 vote.  The concerned commissioners said the earlier vote had been quite in order.  It 
had originated in a church session, gone through a Presbytery deliberation process, and 
was given the same amount of time for thought and consideration at the General 
Assembly  as every other overture.  They felt the phrase  “dishonored” the careful work 
of the previous General Assembly.  A third issue was the strong sense of pain and 
grievance among those who had supported the engagement process in 2004.  They felt 
they had been ill treated by their Jewish critics.  Their motives had been questioned and 
their character had been impugned in a most egregious way.  They had been called Anti-
Semites, supporters of terrorism, supporters of murder, enemies of Israel, and even 
supporters of potential genocide through the destruction of the Jewish state of Israel.  
They had heard no words of regret from the Jewish side for these excesses, which at 
times seemed to them to border on hate speech.  They felt they had acted on behalf of 
their faith and out  of  positive motives.  Now they  wanted their concerns about how they 
were treated to be put  on record.  They were willing to use wording that would reach out 
to the Jewish community, but wanted also to affirm their own integrity.  They were 
willing to support modifications in the 2004 wording in the interests of comity but did not 
want it to appear that “we had been bullied into completely backing down from our 
previous stand.”  In the end, the wording left some feeling slighted, assaulted, and 
betrayed.  This is a festering wound that has not been addressed. 
Two amendments were proposed at the general meeting.  One expressed solidarity 
with the Palestinians (“we remain keenly aware of the deep and chronic pain of the 
Palestinian people).”  Another would have replaced a section expressing regret for harm 
                                                 
5www:Pcusa.org/Les/Peacemaking.   
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caused to Jews and Presbyterians with one saying “We regret any reportage that has 
caused misunderstanding of the PC (USA)’s Commitment to Peace and Justice in 
Palestine and Israel.”  Both were defeated.  The amendment expressing solidarity with 
the Palestinian people failed by a close 237-273 vote.  The reasons for this are complex 
but partially had to do with the threat of a minority report that would either pass or would 
generate  a divisive debate.  That report would suggest taking the matter entirely out of 
the hands of the MRTI committee. If it passed, it would mean that even “engagement” 
with arms manufacturers would be removed.   Many opponents of the 2004 actions were 
willing to support the compromise because they saw it as a move away from the previous 
position.  Many backers of the 2004 actions were willing to support the compromise 
because they saw engagement, not divestment, as the core of the existing policy and 
believed that would be protected.  If good politics consists of getting people who disagree 
with each other to support a common position, then this was brilliant politics.  Even its 
opponents supported it.  What was not clear was whether it was good theology.  The new  
resolution passed overwhelmingly at all stages, in the drafting committee, the 
Peacemaking Committee, and on the floor of the assembly.  After debate, the body  
adopted the recommended resolution  by a vote of 483 to 28 with one abstention.   
Almost immediately, those from different positions began to represent what had 
happened in very different ways.6  It was a Rashomon moment, when reality seemed to 
yield to perception.  Since the resolution had “balanced” 26 overtures, everyone could see 
or emphasize what they wanted to see or emphasize.  This is the actual resolution:  
 
 
                                                 
6 Newspaper coverage mostly saw a defeat for divestment.  Some headlines illustrate the pattern:  “Anti-
Israeli Divestment Collapses” (American Spectator); “Assembly Retreats from Israel Divestment” 
(Birmingham News); “Presbyterian Policy Reversal” (Chicago Daily Herald); “Presbyterians Cancel 
Divestment from Israel” (Jerusalem Post); “Presbyterians Reverse Stance on Israeli Divestment” (Boston 
Globe);  and “Presbyterian Parley Poised to Drop Divestment Push” (The Forward).  An article in The 
Presbyterian Outlook  illustrated how difficult it was to describe what had happened.  The moderator of the 
Peacemaking Committee said they had created a near-unanimous report, a carefully crafted “consensus,” a 
word that implies a shared agreement.  Another person said it was a fragile, careful compromise, defining 
compromise to mean that “nobody got exactly what they wanted.”  A third person said it was a “fragile 
document, which reflected a consensus” but which could be dismantled by amendments.  Clearly there was 
strong disagreement. Source: Leslie Scanlon, “Assembly approves new divestment statement, softens 
language.” The Presbyterian Outlook, July 10, 2006, pp. 5-6. 
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The Resolution  
 
“After careful consideration of overtures presented, we offer the following:  
 
“1. We acknowledge that the actions of the 216th General Assembly (2004) caused hurt 
and misunderstanding among many members of the Jewish community and within our 
Presbyterian community.  We are grieved by the pain that this has caused, accept 
responsibility for the flaws in our process, and ask for a new season of mutual 
understanding and dialogue.  To these ends, we replace the instructions expressed in Item 
12-10 (Minutes, 2004 Part I,  pp. 64-66) Recommendation 7, which reads  
 
“7. Refers to Mission Responsibility Through Investment Committee (MRTI) with 
instructions to initiate a process of   phased  selective divestment in multinational 
corporations operating in Israel, in accordance to General Assembly policy on social 
investing, and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly Council 
for action.”  With the following:   
 
“7. To urge that financial investment of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), as they pertain 
to Israel, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank, be invested in only peaceful pursuits, 
and affirm that the customary corporate engagement process of the Committee on 
Mission Responsibility Through Investments of our denomination is the proper vehicle 
for achieving this goal.”  
 
2: MRTI was instructed to “ensure that its strategies for engaging corporations with 
regard to Israeli and the Palestinian territories” a. Reflect the application of fundamental 
principles of justice and peace common to Christianity, Islam, and Judaism that are 
appropriate to the practical realities of Israeli and Palestinian societies. b. Reflect 
commitment to positive outcomes. c. Reflect awareness of potential impact upon the 
stability, future viability, and prosperity of both the Israeli and Palestinian economies. d. 
Identify affirmative investment opportunities as they pertain to Israel, Gaza, East 
Jerusalem, and the West Bank.  
 
“3.  We call upon the church: a. To work through peaceful means with American and 
Israeli Jewish, American and Palestinian Muslim, and Palestinian Christian communities 
and their affiliated organizations for an end to all violence and terror against Palestinian 
and Israeli civilians.  b.  to  end the occupation. c.  toward the creation of a socially, 
economically, geographically, and politically viable and secure Palestinian state, 
alongside an equally viable and secure Israeli state, both of which have a right to exist.  d.  
To encourage and celebrate efforts by individual Presbyterians, congregations, and 
judicatories of our church to communicate directly and regularly with Jewish, Christian, 
and Muslim communities, sponsor programs likely to improve relations among 
Christians, Jews and Muslims, and engage in peacemaking in the Middle East.   
 
4. The General Assembly  “does not believe that the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) should 
tell a sovereign nation whether it can protect its border or handle matters of national 
defense.  The problem with the security wall in 2004 and presently, is its location.” The 
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GA “supports fair criticism of the security wall insofar as it illegally encroaches into the 
Palestinian territory and fails to follow the legally recognized borders of Israel since 1967 
demarcated by the Green Line.  To the extent that the security barrier violates Palestinian 
land that was not part of Israel prior to the 1967 war, the barrier should be dismantled and 
relocated.”  
 
5.  “Recognizing that the situation on the ground in the Israel-Palestine area is rapidly 
changing” The General Assembly “is directed to carefully monitor ongoing developments 
of the situation in the Middle East and to examine the policies of the [denomination]…in 
order to make a comprehensive report to the [2008 GA].  
 
6. Instructs the Stated Clerk to communicate this to US officials, Israeli and Palestinian 
officials,  Christian, Jewish, and Muslim bodies “with whom we are in communication.”  
 
“Comment: The Assembly received twenty-six overtures pertaining to the Middle East.  
The recommendation is the result of the General Assembly’s honest and sincere effort to 
address the issues and concerns that appeared in the overtures in a comprehensive and 
concise document.”  
 
End of resolution 
 
Jewish Perspectives on the Outcome 
Jewish Telegraphic Agency. This is the news service used by Jewish newspapers. They 
have a free daily  email service that reaches many people. Their initial news item said  the 
denomination had “distanced itself from its 2004 decision to divest from companies that 
do business in Israel.”  The current resolution would  “replace the resolution of its last 
assembly.”  A longer story on June 19 by Rachel Pomerance headlined “Presbyterian 
compromise appears to please Israel divestment opponents” reported that “although the 
resolution does not formally rescind divestment, most took it to mean that the drive 
toward divestment had been stopped.”7  Quoting one Presbyterian delegate, “the 
probability that they will recommend any sort of divestment is extremely remote.”  
However, a pro-Israeli delegate feared that “Israel’s detractors will abuse the new 
resolution for anti-Israeli ends.”  Another said the issue was a “battle for the soul of the 
Presbyterian church.”  One Presbyterian said that “We’re going to be able to go back to 
our Jewish friends feeling pretty good about this, and I think we did justice to our 
Palestinian friends, too.”  Pomerance noted  that “most seem to be genuinely struggling to 
                                                 
7Pomerance, Rachel.  “Presbyterian compromise appears to please israeli divestment opponents.” Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, June 19, 2006.  
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make an impact for peace in the complex Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Many want 
desperately to help Palestinian Christians, whom they believe are oppressed by Israel.”  A  
follow up article on June 21 by the same reporter entitled  “Church Steps Back from 
Divestment” said  that “Jewish groups were thrilled with the outcome” and, according to 
one activist, the church no longer has a will “to isolate and demonize the State of Israel.”8 
The reporter noted that  “the movement to divest from Israel is restless, constantly 
seeking and finding fertile ground—but so far, at least, ultimately losing in every arena.”  
At this point, “pro-Israel activists” believe  “divestment is now beside the point.”  The 
2004 resolution had “jeopardized the Presbyterian ethic of fairness and deliberation” and 
“compromised the impartiality required” to be a peacemaker.  Informing the Jewish 
readers of the dynamic within the denomination, the reporter noted that the church had 
150 years of engagement with Arab Christians, creating ties that “bind much of the 
Presbyterian leadership to the Palestinian cause.”   
 
The Anti-Defamation League.  The ADL, whose Director  had used harsh words to 
describe the 2004 resolutions,  posted the announcement of the 2006 vote on their 
website amidst several other headlined stories:  National Socialist Movement Largest 
Neo-Nazi Group; Sudan President Blames Jews for Encouraging Peace Keeping Efforts; 
National Alliance Members Charged with Hate Crimes; Wisconsin: Hitler Shrine Will 
not Open. Their headline was “ADL Welcomes Presbyterians Overturning Divestment 
Against Israel Resolution.”  They noted the “acknowledgement” that the “imbalanced” 
resolution had caused “hurt and misunderstanding among many members of the Jewish 
community.”  National Director Abraham Foxman  said on June 21 that the   ADL 
wanted to “applaud members of the Presbyterian Church USA for adopting a new 
resolution on investing in Israel.”  While the earlier resolution was a “cause for alarm” it 
had  “deepened dialogue between local Jewish and Presbyterian leaders, all of whom 
worked diligently and successfully to have that overture reversed.” Still, he said,  there 
                                                 
8Pomerance, Rachel. “Two years after Presbyterian vote church steps back from divestment.”  Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, June 21, 2006. 
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“remain outstanding issues pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian situation that separate the 
PCUSA and the Jewish community which need resolution”9 
 
The Washington Times.  The ADL story  provided a link to a  Judeo-centric June 22 
editorial in the Washington Times  entitled “Presbyterians placate Israel.”10 It said  the 
church had “revised” its policy and  Jewish leaders “were content with the new wording.”  
A leader of the American Jewish Committee was quoted as saying  the new resolution 
subjected Israel to the “same process as every other country in the world” and did not 
single it out as before.  A leader of Reform Judaism said the vote “is a critical step toward 
removing an ugly stain on the church’s history of fighting for peace and justice.”  
Abraham Foxman was quoted as thanking the church for acknowledging “hurt and 
misunderstanding.”  The story did not quote any Presbyterian official or commissioner 
involved in the Birmingham deliberations.   
 
Simon Wiesenthal Center.  This organization had engaged in some of the most 
vehement renunciations of the 2004 vote. Its press releases on June 21 and 22  praised the 
decision “to vacate Anti-Israel Divestment” and replace it with “proactive actions to 
benefit both Palestinians and Israelis.”11  It was “A turning point in ending the campaign 
to demonize Jewish state.”  They said the earlier resolution had “proved to be a huge 
barrier to Church unity” and the denomination had “apologized for the pain caused to the 
Jewish community.”  The commissioner’s resolution “declaring suicide bombing ‘crime 
against humanity’” [summarized below] will boost the international campaign to curb 
what their headline called  “Scourge of 21st Century.”  It is “a significant step forward in 
the campaign to curb what has emerged as terrorists’ most deadly tool of mass terror and 
murder.”  Clearly seeing this as a first step, they said the resolution, if adopted by others,  
could “create a legal tool to go after those who incite, plan, and abet such activity.  It 
                                                 
9 www.Adl.org 
10 www.Washingtontimes.org.  
11 www.Wiesenthal.com. 
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would further empower victims and their families to take legal action against the food 
chain of terrorism.”   
 
American Jewish Committee  The AJC said they “applaud” the decision of the church 
“to adopt a more constructive and positive approach to peacemaking in the Middle East, 
changing its course from its 2004 divestment resolution.”12  They said the earlier 
resolution had singled out “companies doing business in Israel for special scrutiny.”  
Now the church acknowledged “Israel’s right to protect its citizens” with a “more 
constructive and nuanced approach to Israel’s security fence, which has saved the lives of 
untold numbers of Israelis and Palestinians.”  They said, “We are deeply moved by the 
Presbyterian Church’s acknowledgement of the damaging effects that its previous 
decision had on relations with the Jewish community and welcome the church’s renewed 
commitment to engage in positive peacemaking efforts.”  This will create a common 
approach to “advocating a peaceful two-state solution to the region.”  
 
Presbyterians Concerned for Jewish and Christian Relations, a pro-Israel, anti-
divestment organization  closely linked to Jewish groups, headed its website story with 
the word “Victory!”13   They said the General Assembly vote was “to reverse its 2004 
divestment policy as well as to withdraw its blanket condemnation of the security barrier 
between Israelis and Palestinians.”  It expressed concern that “pro-divestment activists 
and some denominational officials are committed to pursuing divestment under cover of 
the MRTI committee as thought the recent vote of the General Assembly had not 
happened.”  They cited the statement of Stated Clerk Clifton Kirkpatrick that the action 
“does not overturn” divestment policy.  “How one can reasonably conclude that a new 
policy designed to ‘replace’ a prior policy in no way alters that policy defies any 
reasonable interpretation of this year’s overwhelming vote.”   
  
                                                 
12 www.ajc.org, June 21, 2006.  
13 www.Pcjcr.org. 
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Jewish Voice for Peace, which had praised the 2004 vote,  said that the General 
Assembly  had “reaffirmed” that vote and “did not back down” in spite of “horrendous 
attacks against them organized by 12 powerful Jewish mainline organizations who totally 
misrepresented their actions in the 2004 Assembly.”14  They described “Orwellian 
headlines and bad reporting” and reassured readers that the denomination “has no 
intention of backing down from making a powerful moral judgment about the 
occupation” and that they “reaffirmed their policy of using economic pressure to help 
bring an end to Israel’s occupation in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.”  They 
voted “to continue the same process of corporate engagement they started in 2004” and 
“reaffirmed their opposition to the portions of the wall being built on pre-1967 territory.”  
JVP noted that while this was a “softening of the divestment language,” the resolution 
also expressed the Presbyterian commitment to ending the occupation in East Jerusalem.    
 
Three Reflective Essays Published by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency 
The Jewish Telegraphic Agency  published three articles trying to explain to their 
Jewish readers why the Presbyterians voted as they did in 2004 and why they changed 
their position in 2006.  Two by Jews seemed to suggest that the Jewish side had 
overreacted in 2004 and needed to think through what had happened, what had not 
happened, and how they had handled (or mishandled) the matter. The Jews  tried to 
explain that Presbyterians were not evil, and that Jews had made mistakes because of 
their own narrow perspectives and tendency to confront critics.  The third author was a 
former Presbyterian Moderator whose article, “Two Years of hard work shows 
Presbyterians just want ‘shalom’” outlined a Presbyterian perspective.    
 
Ethan Felson  of the Jewish Council for Public Affairs (a major mainstream coalition of 
community groups) explained what Jews had learned in the past two years.15 He said the 
2006 outcome was the result of “hard work of pro-Israel activists, along with intense 
                                                 
14 Suransky, Cecilie and Mitchell Plitnick, Jewish Voice for Peace, June 24, 2006 
(www:Jewishvoiceforpeace.org).  
15 Felson, Ethan.  “Fight to overturn divestment call can provide lessons for activists.”  Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency,  June 15, 2006.  
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conversations within the church.”  He specifically mentioned three major organizations, 
The Israel Advocacy Initiative,  United Jewish Communities, and Jewish Council for 
Public Affairs. The Jews had “rejected a frontal assault” and “didn’t form an alliance of 
Jews and Presbyterians to take on the church.”  He said “grassroots dialogue was our 
approach,” involving over a dozen Jewish groups coordinating their actions.  What was 
the approach?  First, we share goals: Israeli-Palestinian peace, ending terrorism, two 
viable states, an end to suffering.  Second, we have different narratives, pro-Israelis 
focusing upon terrorism as the key issue, pro-Palestinians upon the occupation. Third,  
while Evangelicals embrace Jews and often “see Muslims as an anti-Christ,” liberal 
Christians tend to “view Palestinians as powerless, virtual co-religionists whose plight is 
paramount.”  Most are not anti-Semites.  Fourth, for many in the church, power is “evil”   
and “The more powerful party must take the first move.” Fifth, “Experience has 
conditioned us [Jews] to project strength through confrontation.”  Implicitly,  this was not 
always wise.  Sixth, “History matters.  Justice, for us,  is doing the right thing, morally 
and ethically.  For others, justice often means alleviating the suffering of the weak.”  
Finally, “At the end of the day, it’s all about whom you know.  We have reached out and 
had difficult conversations, and we were heard.”  
 
Rachel Pomerance, a Jewish reporter for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, described her 
experiences covering the GA meetings.16 She said there was a “gulf of misunderstanding 
between Presbyterians and Jews.”  A “tremendous naivete” revealed itself,  extending “as 
much, if not more, to Jews as to Presbyterians. Each group knows little about the other, 
which is what made the whole issue so difficult.”  While “Jews, of all people, should 
recognize the tribalism inherent in the Presbyterian allegiance to Palestinian Christians,” 
still “Jews view the Presbyterian divestment drive in maddeningly simple terms” because 
of  “a Jewish reflex to instantly define who our friends and enemies are.”  Jews know 
little of Christianity,  “a central tenet of which is peacemaking.”  There is a gap of 
understanding. “Presbyterians have difficulty grasping Jews’ spiritual connection to the 
                                                 
16Pomerance, Rachel.  “For one reporter, divestment fight illustrated Jewish-Protestant gulf,” Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, June 25, 2006.  
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Land of Israel, while Jews struggle to understand the connection between Presbyterians 
and Arab Christians.”   
 
Reverend Susan Andrews, former Moderator of the denomination, is from the social 
justice tradition of the church.  She wrote on June 25 of how Presbyterians had struggled 
to reconcile two deep commitments while working for reconciliation between Jews and 
Presbyterians.17  The first commitment was to maintain “respectful and affectionate 
interfaith relationships with our Jewish brothers and sisters.”  The second was to “our 
solidarity and love for our Arab brothers and sisters in the Middle East, a solidarity and 
love based on 150 years of mission and engaged ministry with Christians in the region.  
The sufferings and injustice caused by the occupation of Palestinian lands has greatly 
diminished the Christian presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  We grieve just as 
much with remaining members of our Christian family whose lives have become 
intolerable, as we grieve with our Jewish Brothers and sisters who live in the fearful 
shadow of suicide bombers.”  The 2004 resolutions “caused great pain and dismay among 
our Jewish partners, even as it gave great hope to our Palestinian partners—and left 
Presbyterians divided as a denomination.”  The 2006 resolution reaffirmed the 
commitment to a two-state solution, and “the moral responsibility we Presbyterians have 
claimed to be socially responsible in investing our resources…” For two years now, we 
have “been in dialogue with Jewish friends and partners, listening to the expressions of 
concern” even as “we also have heard the gratitude and hope that our actions gave to our 
Palestinian Christian partners who have often felt abandoned and sidelined by the wider 
Christian world.”  The 2006 resolution “refocuses, rephrases and reinterprets the actions 
we made in 2004, but it does not repudiate those actions.”   
The Letter of the Twelve Majors 
In early June,  twelve major Jewish organizations (called here The Twelve 
Majors) sent a lengthy letter to the General Assembly.18  (The organizations are listed in 
                                                 
17 Andrews, Reverend Susan.  “Two years of hard work shows Presbyterians just want ‘shalom.’” Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, June 25, 2006. 
18 “Dear Commissioners and Advisors.”  A letter from 12 major Jewish  organizations to the 217th General 
 16
the footnote).  It was an effort to explain in a thoughtful way how Jews saw the issues.  It 
outlined what it called the Jewish “narrative” and Jewish “memory” and explained why 
the resolution had produced “extreme responses.”   It was a well-drafted letter, obviously 
reaching for mainstream Presbyterian thinking.  Given the broad range of perspectives 
within those twelve organizations, ranging across the theological, political and 
ideological landscapes, it contained  both progressive and non-progressive points,  and 
sections that ranged from conciliatory gestures to reasoned discourse to minimally-
constrained polemics.  It is an important document that deserves a full summary:  
“As you prepare to represent yourselves…we would like to reiterate our 
concerns”  in a “spirit of candid, respectful, and direct dialogue” addressing  “the most 
contentious issues.”  In phrases echoing the progressive Christian tradition, the letter 
noted that “Our scriptures reveal that God created all of us in the divine image—human 
dignity and equality is [sic] a core value of Jewish and Christian traditions.  We are all 
made less when the value of human life in cheapened in any way. Furthermore, our 
traditions call upon us to be peacemakers…Peace comes about by our labors to complete 
the work of creation.”  They continued: “Any place in which a single human being 
suffers, we should suffer.  There is suffering enough in the land cherished by us all.  We 
are deeply committed to the welfare and security of the Jewish people, both in the State 
of Israel and around the world.  But let us make clear from the outset that the plight of the 
Palestinians is also in the forefront of our minds.  And we know that unless there is peace 
and security for the Palestinians, there can be no peace and security for Israelis and 
Jews.”  Affirming Presbyterian integrity, they noted that “We know that the Christian 
concern for the Palestinian people, many of whom are your Christian sisters and brothers, 
comes from a deep commitment to the alleviation of human suffering.” 
Then follows a series of arguments for why there is no partner for peace.  When 
the  Israelis made a “historic withdrawal” from Gaza, the Palestinians responded by 
electing a government that “rejects compromise and endorses terrorism as a means to its 
goal, the eradication of Israel.”  While there has been Israeli “intransigence” at times, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Assembly, June 6, 2006.  (www:witherspoonsociety.org/ 2006/three-critiques or www:enddivestment.com/ 
latestnews). It was signed by the heads of  the Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Committee, Jewish 
Council for Public Affairs, United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, Hadassah, American Jewish 
Congress, Jewish Labor Committee, B’nai B’rith International, National Council of Jewish Women, Union 
for Reform Judaism, Jewish Reconstructionist Federation, Jewish War Veterans.    
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“we do not accept that there is any moral equivalence between those who initiate 
terrorism and those who take defensive actions to stop it…” The leaders wrote that there 
is a  Jewish “narrative” we want you to understand, that  “history and  the events of the 
past are a critical part of our memory and influence the ways we imagine strategy and 
outcomes for the future.”  In 1948 Israel accepted a two-state solution but it was rejected; 
for nineteen years, Israel was “isolated and boycotted” and subjected to “constant attack;” 
The Arab League rejected Israel’s right to exist; the Palestinian National Council called 
for Israel’s destruction; Iran’s President continues to call for the “total annihilation of the 
Jewish state;” the Hamas charter rejects Israel’s right to exist; textbooks and rhetoric 
“inculcate negative views of Jews and too often legitimize violence.”  Since these 
rejections are the cause of violence, it is reasonable to assume that “even after a 
resolution of the conflict” the violence will continue.  “You can understand why we feel 
that violence stands as the primary obstacle to peace.”   
Even though “the mainstream Jewish community and the Ecumenical Protestant 
community” share “a deep commitment to social and economic justice, human and civil 
rights, and peace” there is a “negative history.”  We are “natural allies” in our 
commitments  but “memory also grounds us,” a memory that “far too often our Christian 
sisters and brothers, most particularly some in the mainline Protestant denominations, 
have remained too silent in the face of this persistent hatred, rejection, and violence 
aimed at Israeli men, women, and children.”  We were “startled” that some  believe an 
“economic lever” should be used  against Israel. “We believe that this policy undermines 
peace, promotes extremism, exacerbates conflict, damages the relationship between Jews 
and Christians” and “is dangerously ill-matched with our passionately shared vision of a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict.  Instead, divestment is a bludgeon that provokes 
extreme responses from all sides.”  
The letter ends with five points:  1. Any policy that seems to discriminate against 
Jews “is fraught with inescapable associations.”  It polarizes our communities and 
“provokes such a strong response in Israel and within the Jewish community that 
constructive Christian involvement becomes less possible.”  2.  Divestment “focused 
solely on Israel” seems to “shamefully paint only Israel as a pariah nation.” If your policy 
is not “universally applied” it seems to “smack of discrimination” and implies a “double 
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standard.”  3.  Divestment is inevitably linked to comparisons with the anti-apartheid 
movement.  The purpose of that movement “was to delegitimize and end the Apartheid 
regime.  It will be impossible to disabuse most Jews…that no such comparison is meant.”  
4.  Divestment “may well undermine willingness by Israelis to imagine peace.”  While 
Israel is powerful militarily, “decades of terror and international isolation” have left 
Israelis feeling “threatened and isolated.”  Remember  that “the greatest strides by the 
Israelis have come as the result of international support.” 5. Divestment  “validates and 
supports Palestinian intransigence” and gives the impression that “the world will allow 
Israel to be destroyed and Palestinian extremist dreams realized.”  
The final paragraph says that while these issues, have become “divisive,” it is 
time to work for “reconciliation.”   There are “many meaningful coexistence programs” 
that can move beyond “the teaching of hate and the resort to violence” Although 
Presbyterians and Jews “embrace different narratives that bring us to this point, we share 
unmistakably similar goals—two states, living side by side, in peace and security.”  
Divestment is a “stumbling block to all we envision collectively.  Our prayer is that you 
permanently remove this obstacle to peace.”  
 
A Statement by Presbyterian Officials 
 
The General Assembly, “Knowing their decisions would be interpreted, and 
misinterpreted in a number of ways,” asked the leaders of the denomination, the 
Moderator and the Stated Clerk, to write a pastoral letter explaining what the assembly 
had decided and what it had not decided.  The Letter was issued June 25.19  It said that 
“In this meeting, we saw commissioners and advisory delegates living out in word and 
deed their deep commitment to the gospel of Jesus Christ, their passion to be living 
expressions of Christ’s love to the world, and their eagerness to be a part of the future 
God intends for the PC (USA).  We experienced the Presbyterian process of doing things 
at its best.  We observed people working fairly and treating each other graciously.”  
Regarding Israeli-Palestinian issues they noted the following:  “This General Assembly 
                                                 
19Gray, Reverend Joan S. (Moderator) and Reverend Clifton Kirkpatrick (Stated Clerk).  Pastoral Letter on 
2006 General Assembly, June 28, posted on www:Pcusa.org, also in a report  by Jerry Van Marter, 
“Moderator, stated clerk issue pastoral letter on General Assembly,”  Presbyterian News Service, June 28, 
2006. See also General Assembly, Frequently asked questions about the Israel/Palestine actions of the 
217th General Assembly (2006) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), www: pcusa.org/oga. 
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acknowledged that the actions of the 2004 assembly caused hurt and misunderstanding 
among some Presbyterians and our Jewish neighbors.  However, this assembly did not 
rescind the previous action on divestment.  Divestment is still an option, but not the goal.  
Instead, this assembly broadened the focus to corporate engagement to ensure that the 
church’s financial investments do not support violence of any kind in the region.”  The 
struggle within the assembly was not harmful but was beneficial, a “healthy struggle to 
discern God’s will.”    
 
Thoughts on What Happened and Why 
 
What happened at Birmingham is not easily summarized.  There were complex 
dynamics that produced a murky set of outcomes.  In a sense, the Rashomon analogy, that 
there are multiple versions of reality, is not correct.  A better analogy is that of the blind 
men and the elephant: there are multiple realities.  Here are thirteen,  some of which are 
inconsistent with others, all of which are true.  
 
Nothing Happened:  In terms of what was passed,  not much changed. There is still a 
commitment to the 1967 border, a criticism of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, 
and a criticism of the security wall to the extent that it crosses the 1949 green line that 
serves as the internationally recognized Israeli border. The word divestment was replaced 
with “constructive engagement” but the MRTI process of “socially responsible investing” 
for peace is still in place, and in fact was re-affirmed.  Those who claim victory on this 
point are quite correct. Given that the term “constructive engagement” was bandied about 
in 2004 and that the core of the original resolution is still in place, one wonders: If that 
term had been used in the original resolution, would the brouhaha have occurred?  Most 
likely, it would have, which means the real issue was not the possibility of selling  five 
stocks, but something else.  
 
Divestment, not:  Before the vote, the probability that the church would sell any stocks 
was small.  The two main investment arms of the denomination were opposed and even 
MRTI had doubts.  After the vote, the situation was the same.  As the denomination has 
been saying for over two decades, the goal is corporate engagement.  Selling stocks is the 
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last and least preferred option.  Divestment would not be considered for some years and 
would require the approval of the General Assembly.  Support for divestment was weak 
before the 2006 assembly and remains unlikely in the future.  
 
 The Presbyterians backed off.  This vote was a seismic shift.  Call it what you will—a 
reversal, a stand down, a distancing--the body moved. The assembly did not repudiate, 
reject, or rescind its previous vote (all terms used in news reports).  But in 2006 its policy 
was profoundly different from what it was in 2004. Some speculate that this was just a 
tactical maneuver to neutralize a difficult situation.  Others saw what happened  as a 
challenge to the historic social witness policies of the church. The opening sentence of 
part 4 of  the resolution said that the General Assembly “does not believe” that the church 
“should tell a sovereign nation whether it can protect its border or handle matters of 
national defense.”  This seemed to imply a limitation on the areas in which the church 
could offer teachings and was thus inconsistent with the theological tradition of the 
church, that God’s dominion extends over all of creation including the international state 
system.20  This wording, suggested by the drafting committee, was amended by the full 
Peacemaking Committee but then restored by the assembly. Regardless of the impulse of 
the changes,  the conflict over the social witness policies of the church was of great 
importance to the assembly, which was more conservative than those of years past.    
 
The outcome was not surprising: Because of how Presbyterians make decisions, the 
outcome in retrospect was predictable. Presbyterians pride themselves in a cautious, 
deliberative process that tries to find a middle ground.  The Peacemaking Committee had 
before it five options for how it could handle the diverse overtures it had received.  It 
could approve them, approve as amended, disapprove, refer (to a future assembly or a 
Task Force), or answer the overture with an alternate resolution.  Under different 
circumstances they might well have referred the whole matter to the proposed Task Force 
                                                 
20 Some commissioners made reference to the Barmen Declaration (sections 8.15 to 8.24),  a key part of the 
Presbyterian constitution.  For example, section 8.15 states that “We reject the false doctrine, as though 
there were areas of our life in which we would not belong to Jesus Christ, but to other lords—areas in 
which we would not need justification and sanctification through him.”  See “The Theological Declaration 
of Barmen,” in The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (U. S. A.), Part I, Book of Confessions, 
(Louisville, Kentucky: Office of the General Assembly, 1983). 
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but given the tensions surrounding this issues, and the extent to which the denomination 
was divided, it was more likely they would seek a middle ground.  The center of gravity 
of the overtures was hostile to the previous vote.  Both sides put an incredible amount of 
energy into the issue over the previous two years.  Those who supported the 2004  
resolutions  put their efforts into education rather than new overtures since they had a 
policy in place and needed only to  protect it.  The new overtures came from those 
opposed, and, as the writing committee said in its  draft  resolution, their wording  
responded to “the issues and concerns that appeared in the overtures.”   Had the 
Peacemaking Committee based its recommendations only on the overtures before it, the 
outcome could have been an even greater shift. However, they had to put into the balance 
the 2004 action and the courageous statements of the Stated Clerk and the Moderator in 
defending those actions.  Repudiating what had happened before would have created yet 
more problems and may not  have passed.  The “delicately balanced” resolution presented 
to the assembly tried to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis.  The outcome was the 
proverbial camel, a horse designed by a committee.  
 
A coalition of opponents carried the day.  Several elements  within the denomination 
opposed  the 2004 vote.  A conservative or evangelical element is very pro-Israeli and 
was shocked at what happened in 2004.  Another element feels that Christianity 
committed an offense against the Jews in the 20th century and will resist any action that 
might harm the Jewish-Presbyterian relationship. A third element feels that the 
denomination is too “political” and takes too many positions on issues peripheral to the 
church’s true role.  There are also Presbyterian security hawks  appalled by the attacks on 
Israel.  They  see Israeli violence as reactive and defensive and as part of a broader “war 
on terror.”  All of these elements wanted to move away from the 2004 policy.   
 
Bigger fish to fry:  The Presbyterian denomination is very divided and is facing a 
potential schism.   There are really two cultures, two narratives and two theologies within 
the church.  One side sees the gospel in terms of essential, correct, faithful beliefs and 
behaviors that must be defended.  They look at certain biblical passages and feel there is 
a Christian obligation to support Israel.  (Passages often cited are Genesis 12:1-3, “I will 
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bless them that bless thee and curse him that curses thee;” Isaiah 55:3 “I will make with 
you an everlasting covenant;” and references to promised territory in Genesis 15 and 
Deuteronomy 11).  The other side is “prophetic” in that it sees a continuing revelation of 
God’s gracious love rooted in radical hospitality, inclusion, solidarity, justice, and social 
witness.  The 1967 Confession emphasizes the obligation to pursue reconciliation, 
“healing the enmities which separate men from God and from each other.”  Believers are 
obligated to “pursue fresh and responsible relations across every line of conflict, even at 
risk to national security, to reduce areas of strife and to broaden international 
understanding.”21 In recent years, the most  angry battles within the denomination have 
centered on the volatile issue of the role that homosexual persons should play in the 
church. Both sides are passionate and relentless, with organizations that constantly push 
for positions unacceptable to what we might call the Big Center of the membership.22  
Those on the conservative side have spoken openly of  a “gracious separation” into a  
separate denomination.  In 2006, the church had worked for five years on a report that it 
hoped would keep the denomination  together. This was the Theological Task Force on 
the Peace, Unity and Purity of the Church, which many conservatives feared would  
covertly permit presbyteries and congregations to ordain practicing homosexual persons 
as deacons, elders, and ministers.  The Big Center did not want the debate on that report 
distracted by a bruising fight over the Middle East. They did not want a convergence of 
issues that might create a dynamic they could not anticipate or control.  In the end, the 
Task Force Report passed by a  slim 57% to 43% margin.23 This margin suggested a 
possible explanation of why the General Assembly was the most conservative in recent 
memory.  Could it be that social conservatives lobbied to be included as commissioners  
                                                 
21“The Confession of 1967,”  ibid. 
22 The idea of a Big Center is inspired by the writings of William J. Weston.  Weston believes that the 
church is dominated by a cautious, conservative majority that is more interested in protecting the integrity 
of the community of faith than in advancing their own particular views. They will always seek the middle 
and may actually vote against their own preferences to protect the institutional church.  See Leading from 
the Center: Strengthening the Pillars of the Church (Louisville, Kentucky: Geneva Press, 2003).  
23 For a helpful discussion of the Report and reaction to it, see William J. Weston, “Containing Diversity:  
How the Report of the Theological Task Force on the Peace, Unity, and Purity of the Church was Received 
by the Presbyterian Church (U. S. A.).”  Presented to the Fifth Triennial Meeting of the International 
Society for the Study of Reformed Communities, Princeton Theological Seminary, July 9-12, 2006. 
 23
and that this shifted the ideological balance of the assembly to the right?  Whatever the 
explanation,  the result was obvious.  As one observer put it,  “it looks as if we threw the 
Palestinians under the bus.”  If by that, the person meant that the Presbyterians chose to 
put their energies into saving their denomination, and that the status of the Palestinians 
was peripheral to that goal,  then indeed, they threw  the Palestinians under the bus.  In 
any case, the ongoing peril of Palestinians in  Gaza and the West Bank was not addressed 
as clearly as the attempt  to heal the relationship between Jews and Presbyterians. 
    
The Jewish mainstream pushed aside the militants.  The Jewish community is also 
very divided.  A mainstream element is more cautious in their words and more 
cooperative in their approach towards other Americans.  They are more sympathetic to a 
negotiation process in the Middle East, and are generally more optimistic in their views.  
The Jewish right is very different.  They are fixated upon the threat to the Jewish people, 
domestically and in the Middle East, tend to think in terms of ancient enemies who re-
emerge in different forms, and often see their opponents as pathologically obsessed with 
hatred of Jews.  Their words tend to be very harsh.  In 2004 the attack on the 
denomination was led by those on the right: the Anti-Defamation League,  the Simon 
Wiesenthal Center,  the Chicago Board of Rabbis, the Zionist Organization of American.   
Mainstream Jews decided that negotiation and good will were more likely to produce 
results than such attacks.  They began a campaign of quiet dialogue that one described as 
“among the most difficult we have ever had,”  and saw ten Presbyteries out of 172  
present overtures asking that the resolutions of 2004 be revised. Knowing that the 
General Assembly uses open hearings  in their deliberations, the Jewish leadership 
(supported by friendly Presbyterians) availed itself  of this openness to bring in speakers 
for those who wished to hear them. The letter of The Twelve Majors  reflected this new 
approach. As with the Presbyterians, this was an effort of the Jewish Big Center to do 
damage control.  While that letter raised rhetoric points that progressive Presbyterians 
would not accept, it was presented in a way that was respectful and palatable to 
Christians.  In the end, the Jewish community found Presbyterian voices that resonated 
with theirs and the Big Center of the church responded to the Big Center of the Jews with 
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a conciliatory resolution.  This was a great victory for the Jewish side, which had put an 
exceptional amount of energy into persuading the Presbyterians to change their position.  
 
The Jewish Right is still loaded for bear.  Abraham Foxman put it well: While he 
“welcomed” the decision to overturn an “umbalanced” resolution that had “targeted” 
Israel and caused “hurt,” he  noted that “there are still many issues pertaining to the 
Israeli-Palestinian situation that separate the PCUSA and the Jewish community which 
need resolution.” This will not be the last time Presbyterians or others who speak for 
Palestinian rights be called Anti-Semites or hear harsh, confrontational  words.    
 
The Moral High Ground:  Many Presbyterians who supported the 2004 resolutions 
were totally befuddled by the responses from within the Jewish community, seeing them 
as bigoted attacks or often as insincere efforts to mobilize Jewish opinion by distorting or 
even fabricating what was in their resolution.  In fact, there was a  logic to the reaction.  
As one person said,  “A century ago, someone wrote that a Jew is an exposed nerve.  We 
still are.”  In the early 1990s the American Jewish Committee issued a study that 
addressed what it called the “Jewish Worldview.”24  As they put it, Jews see “threat and 
vulnerability” in the Middle East, “peril and weakness” in the US.  Pro-Israeli activists 
“view the US as a battlefield…an arena with friends and enemies.”  There is “traditional 
and historic Jewish mistrust of other groups with strong religious or group-oriented 
commitments.  The ‘historical mythos’ of American Jews sees anti-Semitism as most 
prevalent among conservative nationalist and religious groups…” Jews are “uniformly 
and by a wide margin” most concerned about African-Americans and religious 
conservatives, but are less concerned about mainline Protestants.  The 2004 vote was a 
shock to Jews, coming from a group that did not fit their categories.   
When Abraham Foxman and others expressed concern that Israel was being 
treated as “morally equivalent” to lesser states, especially South Africa25 or when Morton 
                                                 
24 Steven M. Cohen. “After the Gulf War: American Jews’ Attitudes Toward Israel.  The 1991 National 
Survey of American Jews.” New York: American Jewish Committee, 1991. 
25 Stockton, op. cit., 104-05.  
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Klein of the Zionist Organization of America said (in a statement cosigned by a 
supportive Presbyterian)  that, “Israel is a just society and the only democracy in the 
Middle East,” they tapped into another element of how Jews view the world.26 They see 
themselves as a people chosen by God to survive and to adhere, at least in their higher 
hopes, to principles of justice.  They see Israel as a moral nation, acting upon principle, 
with great “restraint,” fighting an implacable, often demonical enemy.  They believe the 
Israeli army practices what they call the “purity of arms,” and only uses its weapons 
when it has no alternative, for defense, and with great concern for human casualties.27  
This point was reinforced quite dramatically almost as the Presbyterians were gathering.  
When a Palestinian family was blown up on a Gaza beach,  Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert asserted that the Israeli army was the “most moral” army in the world.28 As 
Israelis saw it, in 2004 (and onward), they were under assault and were defending 
themselves.  Some watching the Israeli invasion of the West Bank and the destruction of 
the Palestinian Authority in 2002 had a different interpretation of events, but perhaps we 
should remember all those Americans who insist that the United States has never fought 
an aggressive war but only uses its armed forces for defense, to protect innocent people, 
or to spread democracy, freedom and free trade.  Americans and Israelis are not all that 
different in certain aspects of their worldviews.  
From this perspective, the impact of the 2004 vote was not  that the church might 
divest from companies supporting the occupation.  Nor was it that the Presbyterians were 
                                                 
26Klein, Morton.  “ZOA President and Former Presbyterian Elder Condemn Presbyterian Anti-Israel 
Efforts.”  Press Release, June 16, 2006, www.zoa.com.  
27 Ezrahi, Yaron.  Rubber Bullets. Power and Conscience in Modern Israel.  (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1997).  Ezrahi, a professor at Hebrew University,  writes of a “culture war” between those 
who focus Israeli identity upon the higher principles of the Jewish ethical tradition and those who have an 
unhealthy focus upon external threat.  The ethical model is illustrated by an incident during the first 
Intifada (1987-1993) when the Israeli army faced an uprising by a population, not armed resistance by 
military units.  The Israeli commander Dan Shomron ordered the army to act  “with restraint, self-control, 
and sensitivity” and “under no circumstances would force be allowed to be used as punishment” (p. 211).  
Ezrahi  says the adoption of  rubber and plastic bullets by the  military for use against civilians instead of 
using live ammunition was a significant moral statement, in spite of the fact that in close  circumstances 
such bullets could be lethal. In contrast, he cites a prominent American professor who teaches that “we 
should imagine ourselves as fighting evil…that we should feel free to hate, that we should accept the 
pessimistic view of world history as an ongoing war of good and evil” (p. 233).  
28 Olmert, Ehud.  “Comments  at Cabinet Meeting on Kassams and Gaza Incident—June 11, 2006.” Press 
Release, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  www:Mfa.gov.il. 
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allegedly undermining the Israeli economy.  It was that the denomination had distanced 
itself from Israel on moral principle.  They said they did not want to make money from a 
situation that involved human rights abuses or policies they considered inconsistent with 
their faith. That put them in a position morally separate from and in some ways above the 
Israelis, something very hard for pro-Israeli activists to accept.  It also drew an implicit 
distinction between Christian values and Jewish values.  (A key point of the letter from 
The Twelve Majors was that of shared values).  The Jewish leadership seemed little 
concerned that in 2006 the Presbyterians left in place their “process” of potential 
divestment.  The real concessions were that the Presbyterians affirmed a commonality 
with the Jews,  “acknowledged” (i.e., apologized for) the pain their resolution had caused, 
and took a morally humble position vis-a-vis the Jewish community.   
 
A Strategic Loss:  For Israel, this is the best of times and the worst of times.  They have 
never been stronger in the military, economic, or technological realms.  But politically 
and strategically, they are in dire straits.  They are in a swamp and cannot get out.  No 
thoughtful observer believes that the Israeli plan for the West Bank of selective 
withdrawals, concentration of population, and unilateral annexation will bring peace.  
The Israelis are facing the reality of permanent warfare against an opponent who seems 
increasingly defiant and increasingly supported by much of world public opinion.  The 
2004 resolution sent a message from the very center of mainstream Protestantism that 
Israel could not count upon American support forever. It sent many supporters of Israel 
into a near panic that manifested itself in an aggressive-defensive attack. The fact that  
pro-Israel activists were pleased with the actions of the 2006 assembly says much, even 
though that  resolution  included the eighth Presbyterian statement against the occupation 
since the 1980s.  From one point of view, what Israel needs is to be told that they have to 
shift course (see below the views of Tony Judt).   From this perspective, having the 
Presbyterians themselves shift course away from that message was not in Israel’s interest. 
  
Vague Affirmations:  The 2004 vote was a moral statement against the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian lands.  The strategy of Jewish activists in resisting this was to 
call upon a sense of fair play and balance, and ask that Presbyterians be partners with 
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them as well as with the Palestinians.  This made eminent sense to most Presbyterians but 
it reduced the Presbyterian position to that mushy middle ground where they ended up 
with vague kumbaya-type affirmations of “peace” and “reconciliation” and respect for 
Jews and Christians and Muslims.  Some statements in the resolution were so 
universalized and even handed that the message lost its meaning. 
   
Suicide Bombing:  The only statement by the 2006 General Assembly that took a 
position relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was when they endorsed a 
Commissioner’s Resolution to condemn suicide bombing as a “crime against 
humanity.”29  Such a resolution is introduced at the assembly itself and has not gone 
through the normal deliberation process at the Presbytery level.  It was assigned to the 
Social Justice Committee, not the Peacemaking Committee where it would have been 
considered along with other Middle East proposals. The Social Justice Committee 
recommended that the Assembly not adopt the resolution on the grounds that the 
denomination had already condemned suicide bombings and other violence against 
civilians.  It was voted out of committee over the recommendations of the committee 
leadership and was endorsed by the General Assembly by a vote of 348-120-1.  The 
resolution specified that “any suicide bombing, no matter who is the perpetrator or the 
target, constitutes a crime against humanity.”  Noting that international law “affirms the 
criminality of such acts when linked to a government, it is critical that the church and the 
world affirm the culpability of individuals and groups that assist in carrying out suicide 
bombings and terrorism through financial or logistical support and that civil or military 
authorities who fail to exercise adequate powers of control over perpetrators and fail to 
take appropriate measures, be held accountable.”  It called for “international judicial 
prosecution of all those aiding and abetting these crimes” and for action to “empower 
victims of such attacks to be able to bring those who plan and inspire suicide bombings to 
the bar of international justice.”  This was clearly targeted at Palestinians and it clearly 
disrupted the “delicate balance” of the bigger resolution.  The fact that it was passed  over 
the wishes of the Big Center says much, and exhibits how much more conservative the 
                                                 
29 www.pcusa.org/LES/Social Justice.  
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2006 assembly was that those in the past. In a sense, the denomination, in its body 
assembled, intentionally or not, reversed course and  shifted into an ideological position 
that was very compatible with right wing thinking in the US and in Israel. 
 
Round three?  Once a week, in their services, Presbyterians stand and recite in unison an 
acknowledgement that they have sinned against God and against their fellow humans. 
Their willingness in Birmingham to “acknowledge” that they had “caused hurt” was very 
much within this tradition.  When a Jewish leader said the Jews were “deeply moved” by 
the resolution, it was a sincere and generous statement but may have over-read the nature 
of the action.   The resolution  was what it said it was, an “acknowledgment” of hurt, an 
expression of grief that anyone felt pain, and a hope for “a new season of mutual 
understanding and dialogue.”  It did not constitute a reversal or a capitulation.  Human 
actions are ultimately driven by reality and there are four realities that will shape what 
happens in the future.  First, the Presbyterians have a long-term engagement with   
Palestinian Christians and the Arab world.  Those ties will remain firm.  Second, the 
situation in the occupied Palestinian territories is rapidly deteriorating.  Unilateral actions 
by Israel will not stabilize the situation or end the violence. Third, the condition in which 
the Palestinians live is driving extremism among both Jews and Arabs (not to mention 
Americans) and is serving as a major recruiting force for militants. This will escalate over 
time, with serious consequences.   Finally, these realities are here to stay and it is unlikely 
that the Presbyterians will sit on the sidelines while this situation falls apart.  It will be 
interesting to see what comes of the new Task Force on Middle East policy. And it will 
be interesting to see what happens at the 218th General Assembly in 2008.   
A Broader Reassessment 
While the focus of this paper is not upon strategic or foreign policy issues, one 
cannot separate the Presbyterian vote (and revote), or the intense Jewish response, from a 
series of other events of exceptional significance.  In the year 2006 several things happened 
that are likely to be of long term importance in how Americans see and debate the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. These happened as the US struggled  in Iraq and the President’s 
popularity ratings dipped to unprecedented lows.  One development was that Michael 
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Fukayama, one of the more thoughtful of the neo-conservatives, separated himself from the 
movement and its militant Middle East policies.30  The neo-conservatives had been central 
players in the first Bush term.  They were known for the centrality of Israeli security in their 
thinking, and for their determination to remove Saddam Hussein from office.  Fukayama 
was just one intellectual of many, but his public repudiation of his previous position 
appeared to be a part of a general reassessment of US policy in the Middle East.  
Second, several key generals intimately involved with Middle East policy and with 
planning and organizing the Iraq War openly criticized the management of the war.  This 
was not normal political sniping but was a critique from the very heart of the military 
leadership.   General Anthony Zinni was the most significant of these, being the former head 
of CENTCOM, the Middle East force, and President Bush’s former special envoy to the 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.  In various interviews, he told how General Shelton, Chair 
of the Joint Chiefs in the 1990s, called in all his five-star generals to discuss a book called 
Dereliction of Duty.  It dealt with how the military had supported escalation in Vietnam 
even though they knew it was a mistake.  Shelton told the generals  they had not received 
their positions to advance their careers but to protect the national interest.  If they thought a 
policy was wrong, they should make that clear.  In the end, eight retired generals, all 
intimately involved at one time in the Iraq war or the Bush administration, spoke out 
publicly in criticism of how the war was being conducted. It was obvious the eight were not 
speaking only for themselves.31 
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Third, two professors, John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen 
Walt of Harvard University, wrote an essay published in the London Review of Books  
entitled “The Israel Lobby.”32  Mearsheimer and Walt are two of the most respected 
strategic analysts in the academic world, both close to the military establishment and both  
supportive of US strategic involvements overseas.  (In May of 2006, the magazine Foreign 
Policy compiled a list of the most influential academic strategists.  Both men made the 
list).33  They are of the “realist” school that believes nations have interests independent of 
domestic pressures, and that they should press for those interests.  For example, America is 
an industrial state that needs access to oil, and this need operates regardless of whether 
Democrats or Republicans control the White House and whether any particular ethnic lobby 
does or does not favor any particular policy. Their essay focused upon how a collection of 
groups and interests (the most prominent of which was the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee) had “distorted” American national priorities and had inhibited discussion of 
national interests and US Middle East policy by calling those who raised such issues “anti-
Semites.”  They said that Israel had become “a liability in the war on terror and the broader 
effort to deal with rogue states.”  This article provoked a wide discussion.  
British historian Tony Judt commented on some of these developments in an article 
in an Israeli newspaper.34  He argued that Israel is an emotionally “immature” or 
“adolescent” state that  “failed to grow up.”  The Israeli view of their country as vulnerable, 
threatened and acting in self-defense against enemies determined to destroy it is accepted in 
the United States but not in the rest of the world.  The “national narrative of macho 
victimhood” has deprived Israelis of the ability to understand why others commonly 
compare them “at best to an occupying colonizer, at worst to the South Africa of race laws 
and Bantustans.” Israel once had a “strong suit,” that it was “a vulnerable island of 
democracy and decency in a sea of authoritarianism and cruelty…But democrats don’t fence 
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into Bantustans helpless people whose land they have conquered, and free men don’t ignore 
international law and steal other men’s homes.”  Israel has become what early Zionist 
leaders wanted, a “normal” state, “but one behaving in abnormal ways.” Judt believes that 
“shorn of all other justifications for its behavior, Israel and its supporters today fall back 
with increasing shrillness upon the oldest claim of all: Israel is a Jewish state and that is why 
people criticize it.”  In other words, their critics are anti-Semites.    
The suggestion that Israeli actions are  “Jewish” actions (the only logic by which 
criticism of it could be anti-Semitic) has created great difficulties for Jews overseas.   Judt 
(who has written elsewhere of growing up Jewish in London) is concerned that this is “a 
self-fulfilling assertion.”  If Israel is indeed “the state of all the Jews” then it is logical that 
hostility to Israeli policies will be hostility to Judaism and Jews.  Judt believes that “Israel’s 
reckless behavior and insistent identification of all criticism with anti-Semitism is now the 
leading source of anti-Jewish sentiment in Western Europe and much of Asia.”   This 
becomes a vicious cycle in which unacceptable policies generate strong criticism, strong 
criticism generates strident allegations of unworthy motives and the irresponsible use of 
ethnic name calling,  which in turn generates more irresponsible reactions on the other side. 
Judt believes that the root of the stridency is two fold.  First, because of “the 
unquestioning support of the United States” Israel has developed a “lazy, ingrained 
confidence in unconditional American approval” that has enabled it to ignore the untenable 
and morally unacceptable nature of its occupation of Palestinian land.  Second, the 
American situation is changing dramatically because “the United States has suffered a 
catastrophic loss of international political influence and an unprecedented degradation of its 
moral image” throughout the world.  Its strategic analysts have realized that being “tied by 
an umbilical cord to the needs and interests (if that is what they are) of one small Middle 
Eastern country of very little relevance to America’s long-term concerns” is not wise.  The 
United States and Israel have engaged in “a symbiotic embrace whereby the actions of each 
party exacerbate their common unpopularity abroad.” With hostility for the United States 
soaring, the embrace is one that increasing numbers of Americans no longer consider in 
their own interest. If Israel is to salvage its security, it must  acknowledge that it “no longer 
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has any special claim upon international sympathy or indulgence; that the United States 
won’t always be there; that weapons and walls can no more preserve Israel forever than they 
preserved the German Democratic Republic or white South Africa; that colonies are always 
doomed unless you are willing to expel or exterminate the indigenous population.”  
Conclusions 
Presbyterians, in their innocence—and that word has many meanings--wandered in 
2004 into this explosive minefield, and found themselves subjected to a barrage of 
vilification and attacks that were beyond anything they could have imagined. They were 
caught up in a whirlwind that took the form of ethnic and religious confrontation but in a 
broader sense had to do with the restructuring of US strategic policy and redefining the 
Israeli position in the Middle East.  The fact that they were two years ahead of an 
ideological and strategic tsunami caught them off guard and completely unaware.  But what 
is interesting is that they were one of the first to fire a warning shot across the Israeli bow.  
History does not change because of resolutions in denominational meetings, but that 
resolution reflected a wider message, that  Israel cannot count upon American support for its 
occupation forever.  The Presbyterian General Assembly backed off from its earlier 
position, but the reality of world politics has not changed. This is a volatile and dangerous 
age, and having an American denomination step back  does not change that fact.  Nor will it 
change the reality of what is going to happen next year, or the year after that, or after that.   
 
